The 2016 Leros Solidarity Plan That Sought to Relocate Refugees to Valencia

The history of European integration is full of "snapshots" where Brussels bureaucracy and the micropolitical calculations of nation states clashed with genuine humanitarian action. But few cases encapsulate this tragic irony as vividly as the February 2016 initiative betweenSouth Aegean Regionand herRegional Government of Valencia (Generalitat Valenciana). It was the moment when two European regions decided to bypass state indifference and practice autonomous humanitarian diplomacy, attempting to transfer 1,000 refugees from the trying islands of the Dodecanese directly to Spain.

By Rena Pavlakis / realvoice995.gr

Today, with the developments on the southern border of Spain and the crisis inGoddessesto push back the call for forced European solidarity, the recall of those events is not just an exercise in historical memory, but a political document that reveals the stark contrast between words and deeds, highlighting how the central government in Madrid—the one now desperate for help—was the same one that in 2016 erected legal and bureaucratic roadblocks to block a ship of solidarity to head to the Aegean.

The winter of 2015-2016: The Dodecanese in the midst of crisis

In late 2015 and early 2016, the arid islands of the South and East Aegean — centred on Lesbos, Leros, Kos and Rhodes — were at ground zero of the biggest refugee crisis Europe has seen since World War II. Thousands of displaced people arrived on Greek shores every day, while local communities shouldered a disproportionate burden, trying to maintain social cohesion and humanity amid unprecedented operational shortages.

Faced with the slow-moving bureaucracy of Athens and the inaction of Brussels, the Regional Governor of South Aegean,George Hatzimarkos, took the initiative to address Europe's regional administrations directly. The response came from the Autonomous Community of Valencia. The Vice President of the regional government,Mónica Oltra Jarque, accepted the invitation and travelled to Greece to see the reality up close.

The "Message of Leros": The Hatzimarkos - Oltra meeting and the Signing of the Memorandum

The visit of the Spanish delegation to Leros in February 2016 was an essential on-site autopsy of the accommodation structures, a direct contact with the local government, volunteers and residents. The historic Memorandum of Cooperation was signed on the island of Leros (Declaración de Intenciones) between the Regional Governor Giorgos Hatzimarkos and the Vice President Mónica Oltra.

In the text of the Memorandum, the situation was described without diplomatic euphemisms. The resources of governments, regions and citizens were characterized as insufficient in the face of the extent of the crisis. It was emphasized that the islands of the South Aegean were experiencing the daily arrival of hundreds of people in critical condition, while the services were already overloaded.

The Memorandum also recognised something that took Europe many years to accept. That the management of a mass movement of people cannot be the sole responsibility of the first reception areas.

"The European Union must be not only a common area of freedom, security and justice, but also an area of reception and integration",the text said. It was a wording that was almost prophetic!

Because in 2016, when the crisis unfolded in the Aegean, solidarity was treated by many European governments as a voluntary concession. Today, when the pressure has shifted to Ceuta, it is presented—rightly—as a fundamental European obligation.

The "Message of Leros" was crystal clear. The uninhabited islands at the most south-eastern tip of Europe were bearing the brunt of the European crisis. And regional self-government in Europe had the reflexes to provide immediate, humanitarian solutions where central states delayed or entrenched themselves.

The message that the two Regions sent from Leros at the time was summarized in his statementGiorgos Hatzimarkosafter signing:

"The Europe of Enlightenment, mutual understanding and cooperation is still alive. Today, from Leros, we are sending the message of how the Europe we all dreamed of is being built."

That Europe really looked alive.

But only for a few days...

"Instead of raising fences, a European region reaches out to refugees and the trying islands of the Aegean. The Leros Memorandum proves that solidarity is not an empty letter, but a practical political will."— Editors' Journal (EfSyn), February 2016

"El Barco de la Esperanza": The Valencian Business Plan

The content of the agreement was extremely specific, immediately applicable and operationally designed. It provided:

Instant Migration:The Region of Valencia pledged to welcome 1,000 refugees directly from the Aegean islands.
Vessel Charter:The charter of a passenger ship of the Spanish shipping company was organisedBaleària, which in the Spanish media was called«El barco de la esperanza»(The boat of hope) or 'Barcohumanitario».
Full Reception Network:Valencia had already prepared a comprehensive social integration network, which included housing, health care in regional hospitals, school integration for children and specialized legal support for asylum applications.

The ship that stopped before it even set sail

The agreement of the two Regions had to be approved by the governments of Greece and Spain, as the regional authorities did not have the competence to carry out the international transfer of refugees on their own.

The Memorandum itself made it clear that it was not a legally binding text for the two states. However, it was a "firm and public proof" of the joint commitment of the two Regions to seek solutions for the humanitarian crisis in the Aegean.

The Greek side agreed to promote the initiative.

In Spain, however, the plan ran afoul of Mariano Rajoy's government.

Madrid argued that immigration policy, asylum, border management and international refugee movements were the sole responsibility of the central government. It therefore did not allow Valencia to create a direct humanitarian corridor from the Aegean.

Mónica Oltra found herself at the centre of an intense political controversy. For the progressive Spanish media, the Valencian initiative was a practical response to European inaction. For the conservative media and the government at the time, it was a circumvention of the powers of the state, a political venture without the required legal basis.

The Spanish Media 'Civil War': Humanism vs 'Postureo'

The announcement of the pact caused intense political controversy in Spain, which was clearly captured in the Spanish press:

The Progressive Media (El País, El Diario, laSexta) they focused on the humanitarian dimension and the operational readiness of Valencia. They presented the initiative as an example of a "first European region" that bypassed idle European diplomacy and accused the central government in Madrid of bureaucratic rigidity and a lack of political will.

Conservative Media (ABC, El Mundo, Las Provincias) met the movement with skepticism and harsh criticism, characterizing it as a "communication show" (postureo) of the left regional government. They pointed out that Mónica Oltra knew from the start that she did not have the constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy or manage population movements.

Madrid's bureaucratic wall, Rajoy and the shadowy role of Visegrad

In essence, however, behind the dispute about responsibilities there was onepolitical choice.

The central Spanish government of the conservative Prime MinisterMariano Rajoy(Partido Popular – PP) reacted immediately, raising insurmountable barriers:

Refusal of visas.Mónica Oltra went to Madrid to request the necessary visas for the 1,000 refugees, but the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs flatly refused to issue them.

The threat of legal proceedings (Acciones Legales). Madrid has threatened legal action, citing the Spanish Constitution, according to which the management of borders, asylum and foreign policy rests exclusively with the state.

The fear of the "previous".The Rajoy government worried that if it allowed Valencia to implement its own humanitarian policy, Catalonia and the Basque Country would follow, undermining central authority.

The Pressure of the Visegrad Countries (V4):The tough stance of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which refused any mandatory relocation quota, created a hostile European climate. Madrid feared that if it allowed an "autonomous humanitarian corridor", it would be seen as an "open border" country, coming into conflict with the EU's right wing.

As a result, the Baleària ship never sailed. The initiative was cancelled. The 1,000 refugees did not travel from Leros and the other islands to Valencia through the mechanism agreed by the two Regions. Spain later accepted a limited number of refugees through the official and extremely slow European resettlement procedures — but not through the Leros agreement.

When it now became clear that Madrid had put a definitive "block" on the ship from Valencia, the Spanish press recorded the development as abattle of powers between central administration and local government.

On television networks such aslaSexta, Mónica Oltra publicly denounced the Rajoy government's threats of prosecution.

Europe and the loneliness of the islands

To understand the significance of that denial, one must remember the Europe of 2015 and 2016.

Greece and Italy were the main gateways. The European Union had approved a programme for the relocation of refugees to other member states, but its implementation was excruciatingly slow.

The Visegrad countries—Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—put up a hard line against mandatory quotas. Other countries were accepting numbers far below their quota or delaying the process for months.

At the same time, the Aegean islands could not put arrivals on hold until ministers in Brussels agreed. The boats arrived, people disembarked by the hundreds every day. And the so-called European solidarity remained, more a declaration than a deed.

The South Aegean-Valencia agreement was precisely for this reason of such great political significance. It proved that two regional authorities, without having the powers of national governments, could agree on a specific solution.

Where states debated who would not take responsibility, the two Regions had decided what responsibility each would take.

From Leros to Ceuta and the a la carte solidarity

Developments on the Spanish frontier in North Africa—in Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands—reveal a profound political irony. Today, Ceuta is in a state of emergency due to increased migration flows and the inability to manage unaccompanied minors.

The central government of Madrid and the local authorities are now urgently requesting the implementation of mechanisms of mandatory solidarity and redistribution of immigrants in the rest of the autonomous communities of Spain and in the EU member states. That is, they askexactly the help and spirit of solidarity that Madrid itself denied to Greece and the South Aegean in 2016!

In Leros, in February 2016, a ship was ready to travel in the opposite direction to that of the refugees: from the suffocating islands to a society that said it was willing to welcome them.

The ship never left.

Ten years later, as Spain calls for European solidarity, the story of that ship returns.

The comparison of the two periods proves that European solidarity cannot be a la carte. You cannot ask for the support of your partners when you are afflicted, having previously punished and hindered those who wanted to lend a helping hand when the crisis was at the neighbor's door.

Political Legacy: Regional Diplomacy as a Document of Solidarity in Action

The 2016 South Aegean and Valencia initiative remains a historic landmark in regional diplomacy. It proved that local communities and regional self-government have the courage and operational capacity to overcome the shackles of central states. The Leros agreement goes down in history as a living document of responsibility, reminding everyone that solidarity is tested in actions and not in retrospective appeals.

PS: In 2015, when the islands of the Dodecanese found themselves in the midst of the biggest refugee and immigration crisis that Europe had known until then. It is estimated that around 250,000 refugees and immigrants passed through the islands of the prefecture during that period, with Kos and Leros being two of the main gateways. By the end of October 2015, approximately 80,000 refugees and migrants had already been recorded in Kos, Kalymnos and Leros alone, not including the arrivals in Rhodes, Symi, Megisti, Farmakonisi, Agathonisi and the rest of the Dodecanese islands. Flows continued unabated through the end of the year and into the first months of 2016.

The de-escalation started afterMarch 20, 2016, when the European Union-Turkey Joint Declaration was implemented and the so-called Balkan corridor had already been closed. The 2015–2016 biennium total for Greece exceededone million sea arrivals.